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Essay
Beyond the Waste Land: Law Practice
in the 1990s*
by
DAVID SCHuMAN**
It cannot be happenstance that so many of our literary icons
gravitate toward climactic trial scenes. The testing of Antonio's bond
with Shylock,' the parricide prosecution of Dmitri Karamazov, 2 Cap-
tain Vere's encounter with the radical innocence and formal guilt of
Billy Budd 3-these scenes from our culture's most venerated narra-
tives demonstrate that at some level our collective imagination en-
visions law as the public process of forging and testing our most
passionately held beliefs and constitutive values. One would think that
lawyers, as those to whom this process is entrusted, might legitimately
claim membership in a vocation, a calling, implicated in the com-
munity's most fundamental efforts at self-definition, purification, and
consecration. Yet too often today's lawyers do not occupy this world
of profound social meaning; rather, they too often occupy a world
of fiercly contested private disputes with no significance beyond the
amount of billable hours they might generate. Their world is not tragic,
but pathetic. Their text is not The Merchant of Venice, or The Broth-
ers Karamazov, or Billy Budd, but T.S. Eliot's "The Waste Land. ' 4
In that enigmatic masterpiece of modernist poetry, the narrator
surveys a variety of sterile venues, some as arid as the Biblical valley
of dry bones, some as ostentatiously opulent as a gilded drawing-
room, but all inhabited by characters cut off from those things like
passion, piety, reverence, and tradition that might make their lives
* This Essay is adapted from the author's keynote address delivered at the Oregon
Bar Association's "Law in the '90s" conference on April 18, 1990.
** Assistant Professor, University of Oregon Law School. B.A. 1966, Stanford Univer-
sity; Ph.D. 1974, University of Chicago; J.D. 1984, University of Oregon Law School.
1. W. SHAYEsPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, IV.i (1600).
2. F. DosToYEvsKY, THE BRoTHERs KARAmAzov 623-717 (C. Garnett trans. Norton ed.
1976).
3. H. MELVILLE, Billy Budd, Sailor, in BILLY BUDD AND OTHER STORIEs 287, 356-64
(F. Busch ed. 1986).
4. T.S. ELIOT, "The Waste Land," in THE COmPLETE POEMS AND PLAys, 1909-1950 37
(1958).
meaningful and whole by connecting them to others, both living and
dead. It is a land where April is the cruellest month because it stirs
memories of fresh life within souls that are currently barren;5 where
churches are empty and haunted, and the ablest representative of the
supernatural is not God, but a bogus clairvoyant with a bad cold;6
where people say things like, "I never know what you are thinking,"
and "I can connect / Nothing with nothing.' '7
Of all the desiccated inhabitants of these landscapes, the most
memorable to those of us connected with the legal profession appears
only briefly near the end of the poem. The narrative voice, groping
for a single image to capture the essence of life in the Waste Land,
focuses on a "lean solicitor" opening sealed documents "In our empty
rooms." '8 The image is perfect: what was once a home animated per-
haps by the sounds of a family with children and the smells of cook-
ing, is now a collection of empty rooms. Events of emotional
moment-births, deaths, marriages, gifts-have been reduced to life-
less words in sealed documents. In all likelihood those documents
carry the letterhead of a law firm, because presiding over this wasted
world from which all the juice, all the sap, and all the blood have
been refined away stands the Lean Solicitor.
Of the fifteen or twenty solicitors, lean and not-so-lean, who
were my friends in law school, and who are just beginning to move
into positions from which they will define the nature and direction
of the profession in the 1990s and beyond, each one-although pres-
ently employed and making good money-has, without exception,
changed jobs at least once. The bland bar bulletin announcements of
these changes typically conceal a personal dark night of the soul that
leads to the abandonment of one major life commitment in favor of
another. These friends have not left their firms; they have divorced
them. Several of my law school colleagues have divorced the pro-
fession entirely. Some have divorced their spouses, and a few have
picked up a substance abuse problem of one sort or another. Among
my own students, the lean solicitors-to-be, the most perceptive no
longer worry that failure in law school will cause them to lose fi-
nancial security; they worry that success in law school will cause them
to lose their soul-will lead them into the Waste Land of work with-
out significance or moral dimension, where they will connect "Noth-
ing with nothing."
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id. at 38.
7. Id. at 40, 46.
8. Id. at 49.
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Nor can this phenomenon be dismissed as the idiosyncratic grum-
bling of a skewed sample of socially or professionally dysfunctional
yuppie malcontents. The recent literature documents a problem that
transcends generation and region. The Nation recently published an
omnibus review of books on lawyers. 9 The title of the review was
revealing: A Problematic Profession. The books had names like Moral
Vision and Professional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women
and Men Lawyers;0 Making It and Breaking It: The Fate of Public
Interest Commitment During Law School;" and Full Disclosure: Do
You Really Want to Be a Lawyer?12
Closer to my home, a recent Willamette Week article entitled
"The Lawyer Glut' '13 described the local legal community as an ar-
chetypal Waste Land populated by a merger-mad, burnt-out, over-
worked collection of self-destructive hypocrites providing a com-
modity essentially indistinguishable from fast food, all the while cyn-
ically attempting to pass themselves off as practitioners of a high-
minded vocation.
The gist of the Willamette Week article was that an oversupply
of lawyers leads to increased competition for scarce resources-cli-
ents-which in turn leads to monomaniacal emphasis on the bottom
line and hence longer hours, less pro bono, larger and more imper-
sonal firms, and more alienation. The description has the exaggerated
and sensational tone of the six o'clock news or the supermarket tab-
loid, and it does not resonate with the experience of most participants.
Furthermore, it does not take a Ph.D. in economics or logic to spot
the inconsistency in an analysis that simultaneously identifies both
overwork and scarcity of clients as sources of professional discom-
fort.
Surely it is simplistic and wrong to blame the legal profession's
growing resemblance to the Waste Land on overwork and merger ma-
nia, nor can it be blamed on glut. Let me suggest a more global cul-
prit: I believe the root cause of this professional pathology is the
increasingly combative and aggressive nature of the legal profession.
I suggest that too often we treat ruthlessness, paranoia, and insen-
sitivity as professional virtues, cloaking these traits in the amiable
9. Goodrich, A Problematic Profession (Book Review), 250 THE NATION 205 (1990).
10. R. JACK & D. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DEcIsIoNs: THE CHANGING
VALUEs OF WoMEN AND MEN LAwYERS (1989).
11. R. SToVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: TE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COmmrrMENT
DuRINo LAW SCHOOL (1989).
12. YoUNG LAWYERS DrisIoN OF Tm ABA, FULL DISCLOSURE: Do You REALLY WANT
To BE A LAwYER? (S. Bell ed. 1989).
13. Dexheimer, The Lawyer Glut, Wilamette Week, Jan. 18, 1990, at 1.
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guise of zealous advocacy within the adversary system. The word
"adversary" stems from the Latin advertare, "to turn against" or
"to turn upon." In our adversarial Waste Land, we are all turned
against each other. We are paid for being adept and successful at
turning upon others and protecting our clients from being turned upon.
More than earlier practitioners and more than other profession-
als, today's legal practitioner is steeped in and permeated with a com-
plex of ideas that, when left to grow unchecked, are inappropriate
and dysfunctional. The model of that complex of ideas, which might
be called aggressive domination, is the typical lawsuit as it appears
in the appellate opinions that first year law students confront from
the first day of their legal training. Smith and Jones find themselves
with different accounts of what is right. Each of them is represented
by a zealous advocate who has presented a skillfully crafted argument
to a neutral and unbiased magistrate. The opinion is the magistrate's
explanation of why one argument more closely conforms to the rule
of law implicit in the existing universe of precedent, legislation, and
other relevant legal materials. There is a winner and a loser.
The traditional critique of this system is that it trains lawyers not
to concern themselves with whether the right side wins, because in
the adversary system the side that wins is right by definition.'4 The
critique then typically moves on to attack the presumption that pre-
vailing arguments win because they are stronger, instead suggesting
that they often win because they fit more comfortably within the dom-
inant ideology or were propounded by the party with the most re-
sources. But both the proponents and the opponents of the adversary
system believe that the proper method of resolving disputes is con-
frontational. Proponents believe that justice will naturally prevail in
confrontation. Although opponents contend that frequently justice
can be outgunned by superior cunning or better access to resources,
they propose to rectify this injustice not by abandoning adversarial
litigation, but by guaranteeing that both sides have equal champi-
ons-that the confrontation takes place on a level playing field.
My criticism of the traditional model is not merely that it dis-
regards the fact that superior cunning and access to resources often
allow those who should lose to win. Rather, my criticism centers on
the presumption that disputes must have winners and losers, that jus-
tice demands a victor and a vanquished, that the system requires ag-
gressive domination and exclusion of an opponent.
14. By "traditional" I do not refer to any particular critic, but rather to the sort of
criticism one encounters from typical non-lawyers.
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During law school, and even more so afterwards, this presump-
tion undergoes refinements and complications. But its pervasive struc-
ture survives, to color nearly everything a lawyer does, even a lawyer
who never se~sthe inside of a courtroom. In drafting wills, contracts,
partnership agreements, and leases; in counselling on divorce, adop-
tion, and employment matters, we are always asking: How will this
hold up in court? How can I maximize my clients' interests while
protecting them from all imaginable predatory attacks? In litigation
as in drafting, the underlying presumption is that the world of others
is hostile, waiting to attack at the first sign of vulnerability, and that
prudence requires us to be equally hostile. Our metaphors betray us:
the highest praise a legal document can earn is to be called "iron-
clad" or "bomb-proof," terms from the lexicon not of civil dis-
course, but of warfare.
It is small wonder that lawyers, who are trained in the ethic of
the jugular attack and immersed in a system that increasingly forces
complex, multidimensional problems with subtle gradations of moral
nuance into the form of all-out battles, find it difficult to sustain
stable, convivial, and compatible work groups, not to mention fam-
ilies. After all, we are the ones who invented the pit bull deposition,
the interrogatory avalanche, the sadistic cross-examination, the trial
by defamatory press conference, and other forms of hardball Waste
Land litigation.
When our co-workers turn against us or become defensive toward
us, they merely are using the tools and methods we admire when used
against "enemies." When clients turn against us, they are applying
lessons they learned in our offices and courtrooms. When our mar-
riages become, in Kant's terms, reciprocal contracts of mutual use,' 5
they have simply taken the form we assume is appropriate for all
human interactions. A rabbi once noted:
The religion in which we worship writes its name on our faces, be
sure of that. And we will worship something-have no doubt of that
either.... That which dominates our imagination and our daily
thoughts will determine our life and character. Therefore it behooves
us to be careful what we are worshipping, for what we are wor-
shipping we are becoming.' 6
The religions that lawyers practice eight, ten, or twelve hours a day
are aggressive disputation, and for those who are not litigators, de-
15. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ExPosrrION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 110 (W. Hastie trans. 1887).
16. Remarks by Rabbi Harold L. Kudan of Congregation Am Shalom at the Bat Mitzvah
of Naomi Dietzel (Dec. 16, 1989) (Congregation Am Shalom, Glencoe, 11.). These sentences
appear within quotation marks on page 12 of the congregation's privately reproduced prayer
book, but nobody has been able to determine from whom the quote is taken.
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fensive living: the arrangement of human transactions in such a way
as to make them invulnerable to the aggression, greed, and self-pro-
motion we presume are the engines driving all people. If we had to
invent from scratch our own version of the Waste Land, a milieu
characterized by emptiness and alienation, by failures to connect, we
could not invent a more fitting constitutional religion.
So one problem inherent in the combative nature of the adversary
system is our inability to contain it, to limit its influence. There are
no commuters to the Waste Land; you can't work there sixty hours
a week and then shed its influence as you return to the more civilized
suburbs. But even within its acknowledged sphere, even where it be-
longs-in professional advocacy-the form of intellectual warfare in
which we are trained is simply the wrong way to solve many problems.
Divorce and child custody spring to mind. In fact, I sometimes think
that "family law" is a contradiction in terms. When anything even
remotely styled a "family" invokes "the law" as currently practiced,
it is clear that there will ultimately be two sides to a dispute and that
both have already lost.
I do not mean to imply that adversarial litigation is per se il-
legitimate or evil. Although zealous combative advocacy is utterly
inappropriate in some contexts, in others it is perfect. Nobody would
deny that before society incarcerates or executes an accused criminal,
he or she deserves a zealous defense. Likewise, when sophisticated
business people in our society conduct arm's length transactions it
makes perfect sense to presume that each wants to increase her own
advantage to the necessary detriment of the other-although there are
many other societies in which such a presumption would be regarded
as demented and preposterous.
Nor do I mean to imply that lawyers have a monopoly on ad-
versarial conduct. Although we do have a state-granted monopoly on
access to the machinery of state violence-we are the professionals
through whom every citizen or government must work in order to
legitimately deprive others of life, liberty, or property-an adversarial
mind-set is by no means exclusive to lawyers. Rather, we live in a
larger world in which all social institutions teach that people deserve
everything they can take and keep within the limits of the law, other
people be damned. The adversary system, this institutionalization of
paranoia and trial by combat, is just one more expression of beliefs
so familiar we tend to regard them as self-evident facts instead of
speculative hypotheses, cultural constructs, or historically contingent
decisions. These beliefs include the basic idea that human beings are
by nature rational maximizers of their own'self-interest, and the de-
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rivative idea that community happiness and prosperity will flow nat-
urally from a system in which each individual or special interest group
is free to pursue its own selfish ends, limited only by the rights of
others to do the same.
The adversary judicial system and the adversarial role of attor-
neys are inseparably linked to these ideas. They share the assumption
that conflict is not only inevitable but ultimately good; that it is part
of a larger scheme governed by an invisible hand that magically turns
private vices like greed and aggression into public virtues like pros-
perity and stability. 17
It is difficult to examine these ideas about the necessity and value
of conflict with any objectivity because we hold them at such a fun-
damental level. They act as the lens through which we perceive, and
attempting critical analysis of them is like trying to train the eye on
itself. Suffice it to say that through most of human history, thought-
ful observers would have treated these ideas as absurd and deranged,
fitting only for a nursery, an insane asylum, or a Waste Land.
Aristotle, for example, declares that humans are by nature com-
munity-dwelling animals, and that the community is prior to the in-
dividual. In other words, to define a "community" as the result of
allowing a collection of individuals to exercise their rights consistent
with others' exercise of theirs is to define not a community at all, but
a collection of isolated, atomized, and alienated sub-humans. 8 In this
view, the community, its laws, other people and their desires, friends,
family, and colleagues are not obstacles to the individual's fulfillment
lurking out there ready to pounce the instant she lets down her guard.
Rather, they are the very instrument of that fulfillment: this com-
munity of others provides each of us with our identities and our roles;
it binds us together in a web of support and obligation, and in this
way makes it possible for us to be human animals. As Socrates ex-
presses it, even as they are about to execute him, the community and
its laws are his mother and his father. 19
Or take this example from my own field, constitutional law. For
years mainstream constitutional scholars presumed that the under-
lying purpose of our founding charter was to secure individual liberty
from the predations of tyranny, including tyranny of the majority.
Thus, Went the argument, the Constitution erects a government in
which each branch is presumed to check the others because each is
17. The classic enunciation of this parable is found in B. MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF
THE BEES: OR, PRVATE VICES, PUBLIC BEmrxrs (9th ed. 1755).
18. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1-7 (E. Barker ed. & trans. 1958).
19. PLATO, Crito, in Eur-m'ano, APOLOGY, CRrro 60 (F. Church trans. 2d ed. 1956).
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naturally motivated by an inexorable dynamic of self-aggrandizement.
Government itself is checked by the Bill of Rights, which is designed
to protect a core of individual dignity from governmental interfer-
ence. Moreover, a legislature of elected representatives will guarantee
that every interest group will be able to participate in the pitched bat-
tle of policy choice, so that whatever policy emerges can be presumed
to reflect the will of those able to muster a majority and defeat their
opponents. 20 It is not difficult to perceive at the center of this vision
the same presumptions that also enshrine the adversary legal system.
This vision, viewed from the vantage point of a Waste Land, projects
onto the Constitution and the Founders merely an earlier version of
today's world and its presumptions.
But modern scholarship has shown that this account of the Con-
stitution and its founding is incomplete and distorted.21 Individualism
was not the only or even the principal political theory driving the
Founders; the Bill of Rights, after all, was an afterthought. The prin-
cipal goal of the Constitution, expressed in the concepts of federalism
and separation of powers, was to erect a structure that allowed the
people to participate in deliberations that would affect their lives and
shape their values. The principal purpose of checks and balances was
to insure that no measure became law until it had been fully and widely
debated. And the representatives who conducted this deliberation were
not mere conduits of their constituents' selfish goals and naked pre-
ferences, but were people who, by their record of leadership and wis-
20. This account is drawn from such traditional scholarship as E. CORWIN, The Foun-
dations of American Constitutional and Political Thought, in 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION
45 (1981); M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967); Katz, The
Origins of American Constitutional Thought, in 3 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 474
(Bailyn & Fleming eds. 1969).
21. I refer to, and in the remainder of the paragraph draw upon, the scholarship of the
so-called "republican revival." Major contributions to the literature in American history
include: W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1980); B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975);
1 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR
(1981); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Major
contributions to the literature in political theory include: H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963);
H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(2d ed. 1984); H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION (1960). Major contributions
to the literature in legal scholarship include: Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); and essays collected in Symposium: The Republican Civic
Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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dom, were best qualified to participate in discussion about public
matters. That discussion, in turn, was conceived not as a free-for-all
process of interest-bargaining, but as a rational search for common
ground, guided by a virtuous desire to find and promote the common
good.
The purpose of this pedantic excursion is not to change your
understanding of constitutional history, but to demonstrate that like
our conception of the Constitution, our ideas about what law is and
what lawyers do are threads in a larger fabric, and that the fabric
itself is a creation and not a fact.
It would be tempting to conclude that because a combative pro-
fession and judicial system fit so well within the larger political and
social context, there is nothing we can do to alleviate its detrimental
effects short of complete political and social revolution. And it would
be tempting to suggest some utopian alternative social context and
imagine a different role within it for law and lawyers. Take, for ex-
ample, an Aristotelian world in which politics was not the battle-
ground for opposing power blocs overseen by a referee-state, but rather
the rational, deliberate, public, and inclusive search for common
ground. We might envision a legal system in which each party to a
divorce, bankruptcy, or tort claim might have full discovery and ex-
tensive dialogue, with one opportunity to submit a proposed outcome
to a neutral adjudicator, who would be obliged to choose the proposal
she found most just to everybody. The skills needed to represent a
party before such a tribunal would be strikingly different from those
we value today in lawyers, and quite foreign to the Waste Land. The
best lawyer would be the one with the most highly developed ability
to empathize with and incorporate the opponent's viewpoint; to en-
gage in inclusive, conciliatory, and compassionate dialogue; and to
find a solution that put justice before advantage. Zealous advocacy,
relentless promotion of the client's interest, paranoia as a lifestyle,
mutually assured destruction, and other forms of Waste Land liti-
gation would disappear because the lawyer who operated that way
would always lose to the opponent whose proposal was even mar-
ginally more humane.
But this is not the occasion for a utopian manifesto. This Essay
deals with Law in the 1990s, not "Adventures in Fantasyland." Be-
sides, I have probably painted too bleak a picture of the profession
and thereby implied too bleak a future. Eliot, after all, is not in de-
spair at the end of "The Waste Land."
At that juncture, Eliot relates a sermon spoken in thunder, fore-
shadowing moisture-and with it renewal and life. Here is what the
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thunder says (the thunder speaks in Sanskrit, which I provide along
with Eliot's translation): Datta, dayadhvam, damyata. Give, sym-
pathize, control. 22 Can these three commandments apply to our pro-
fessional lives, within the existing world, in such a way as to make
us more connected and whole? Let me offer a few ideas.
Datta. Give. This command does not concern charity, which im-
plies condescension; nor surrender insofar as that term implies loss.
Rather, Eliot has in mind the kind of generosity that expands both
the giver and the receiver. This quality is related to the Renaissance
virtue of magnanimity, from magnus animus, or largeness of soul,
and encompasses an attitude in which one expands the universe of
voices to which one might attend by abandoning a strict and stubborn
adherence to one point of view. How might we work this quality into
lawyering? One way might be to work toward building a bar that
includes and values voices and experiences that have traditionally been
consigned to the margins, opening the bar to women, minorities, poor
people, and lesbians and gay men.
Dayadhvam. Sympathize. Again, this is not pity, which is merely
a form of condescension, but syn pathos, or together-feeling, com-
passion, and recognition of common ground. Can our profession,
built as it is on abstract, rational, and unfeeling rules that are used
in order to gain benefits for one person at the expense of another-
a profession devoted to mechanically sifting winners from losers-ac-
commodate an attitude that values the destruction of distinctions and
emphasizes the oneness of us all? Can lawyers be sympathetic without
being fools or suckers? Or is "sympathetic lawyer" a contradiction
in terms? Sympathy requires the recognition of our own humanity
within others; yet in some respects, our profession rewards us pre-
cisely to the extent we become adept at refining out the ecstatic, griev-
ing, gloating, suffering, sweaty, arrogant, or pathetic humans and
replacing them with faceless, soulless abstractions like plaintiff,
claimant, state, and respondent.
In our professional lives, when a human being walks into our
office, we listen to her story and try to discover what type of case
she is and what rule to apply in resolving it. When students die in
an accident on a school-sponsored trip, we spot an issue sounding in
negligence; when a tavern refuses to serve black people we think of
a section 1983 claim; when a leveraged buy-out closes a lumber mill
we turn our thoughts to control shares legislation. None of these reac-
tions is wrong or evil, but none heeds the command to sympathize.
22. T.S. ELIOT, supra note 4, at 49, 54.
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And yet as lawyers we have another side to our training. In law
school we learn to argue either side of any case, and in practice we
sometimes find ourselves with cases in which we would prefer to trade
places with opposing counsel. Some say that this aspect of our pro-
fession turns us into moral chameleons, and of course that danger
exists. But it might also train us to find in either side of any dispute
some motive, some longing, some frustration, or some rage that we
can recognize and understand-with which we can sympathize. 3 The
spotted owl champion might learn to sense the impotence of the dis-
located and unemployed logger, and the logger's advocate might learn
to sense the holiness of old growth.
The case method and the habit of arguing either side might nur-
ture nihilism, giving rise to the belief that nothing is right or wrong;
but it also might nurture the more sophisticated conviction that every
dispute involves people and every person has a soul like our own.
Shelley recognized the relationship between soul and law when he said
that poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world,2 meaning
that a poet, speaking the language of the heart, speaks truths that
resonate and apply generally. I suggest that in our practices we should
see the possibility that lawyers are the unacknowledged poets of the
world, meaning that as we speak the language of rationality and uni-
versal applicability-the language of law-we speak at least partly to,
and partly from, the heart as well as the brain. This might make our
practices less comfortable, but it might also make them less arid-less
of a Waste Land.
Damyata. Control. At first .blush this might seem an easy com-
mandment for lawyers. Control implies hierarchy and domination,
and as critics (including me) never tire of telling us, ours is a pro-
fession of domination. Again, control in this sense fails to capture
the lesson of the thunder sermon. By this term, Eliot means neither
management, which is the manipulation of individuals into doing what
you want them to do, nor forceful repression. A similar confusion
has overtaken control's synonym, authority. Yet as Hannah Arendt
explains, when force or manipulation begins, authority already has
ended.7Y As Eliot intends the term, control or authority inhere in peo-
ple or institutions or practices not by virtue of force or the threat of
23. Anthony Kronman makes a closely related point throughout his essay Living in the
Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 835 (1987).
24. P. SHELLEY, A Defence of Poetry, in SHELLEY's PROSE, OR THE TRUMPET OF A
PROPHECY 297 (D. Clark ed. 1954) (1st ed. 1840).
25. H. ARENDT, What is Authority, in BETwEEN PAST AND FUTURE: Six EXERCISES IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 93 (1961).
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force, but by virtue of respect. An authority, a person with the ability
to control, is someone who has been right so often in the past that
her counsel cannot wisely be ignored. 26 Legitimate controlling au-
thority does not manipulate existing preferences or constrain freedom,
it guides, enlightens, and enables and, in that sense it "authors," or
"authorizes." When Dante refers to Virgil as his "author" or au-
thority, 27 and when Chaucer uses the term for Boccaccio, 2s it is their
highest tribute; they mean that those men are their creators, their
sources of inspiration and identity, their enablers.
What role can this kind of controlling authority play in our pro-
fession? I suggest that we are ideally placed to exercise authority in
this benevolent sense. We are not only advocates, we are also coun-
selors. People come to us for advice-for wise counsel. Most lawyers
presume that their clients have decided on their goals and know what
their interest is-they want a divorce, they want to leverage a buy-out,
or they want to stop the harvesting of old growth-and that the law-
yer's task is to counsel and aid them in achieving these goals or pro-
moting these interests within the law. I think we sometimes act as
though offering counsel as to the wisdom or morality of the goals
themselves, or engaging the client in a dialogue that will lead to the
discovery of her true interest, is a professional sin. Yet nothing in
the Disciplinary Rules prevents these measures. Nothing prevents us
from reminding the arbitrager that the buy-out will achieve a quick
buck at the expense of a viable and well-run company, or reminding
the developer that the shopping center will substitute faceless fran-
chises for a Main Street of family-owned businesses. Nothing prevents
this except the fear of losing clients. But maybe we will decide to pay
that price in order to ensure that our vocation is more meaningful
than selling fast food, and that we are more than alienated instru-
ments for the achievement of goals decided elsewhere.
And further, we can take our training in the provision of wise
counsel into the public arena. We are, after all, especially qualified
to participate in the public life of the community; we are lawyers,
and as most of us believed before we came to law school, law is the
sinew of the community. Law is a system of values made manifest,
the fruit of public discussion and debate about what constitutes or
26. J. SCHAAR, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE
25-26 (1981).
27. D. ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 6-7 (L. Binyon trans. 1933) ("Tu se' lo mio maestro e 'I mio
autore": "Thou art my master and my author.").
28. G. CHAUCER, Troilus and Criseyde, in THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 401 (F.
Robinson ed. 1957).
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promotes a life of virtue-not what some treatise says about remedies
for anticipatory breach. We can try to be "lawyers" in this larger
sense of law, to use our access to the machinery of the system not
only to promote the private interests of litigants, but also to forge
a public life worth living-a life outside the Waste Land.
Socrates tells us that no evil can ever befall a good person.2 9 So-
crates was no fool, and neither are we. We all know that a good per-
son is as likely as a bad one to get hit by a truck. What Socrates meant
was something like this: A person with a well-ordered soul is immune
from the only kind of evil that matters, corruption and perversion.
To what extent we are a profession of good people in the 1990s re-
mains to be seen. Some would say that our chances are slim. I dis-
agree. I believe that if we attend to the thunder's charge-to cultivate
magnanimity, search for common ground, offer wise counsel-we will
be able to say that we have been to the Waste Land of paranoia,
isolation, and alienated labor, and that we have escaped.
29. PLATO, Apology, in Eurm'iYH o, APOLOGY, Cro, supra note 19, at 48-49.
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